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ABSTRACT 
This paper formalizes the problem of designing optimal 
agendas for voting over finite alternative spaces, when voters are 
assumed to be "naive, " (i.e. , they do not vote strategically). 
The class of agendas considered here is quite broad, and includes , 
as special cases, such methods as pairwise voting, sequential and 
elimination procedures, partitioning schemes , and all binary 
procedures. Given individual preferences over the basic alternative 
space, and various assumptions about how individuals choose between 
subsets of alternatives, one can then formalize the problem of 
designing agendas as a dynamic programming problem and solve for 
optimal agendas, i.e. , agendas having either the highest probability 
of leading to a given alternative or having the highest expected 
utility to the agenda setter. Illustrations are given showing how 
the methods can be applied in specific examples. 
I. 
A THEORY OF OPTIMAL AGENDA DESIGN*
INTRODUCTION 
Consider a group of voters who are faced with � choJ!ce I I I 
they must make among some set of feasible alternatives. Ouk :l!ndiv:il 
(or group of individuals) is given the authority to set lthe l agenda 
I 
for the meeting at which the issue will be decided. By an j•agenda;: 
we mean a specification of exactly what questions will He pht Ito 
a vote, and in what order. At the meeting, the agenda Js abstlmed 
to be the order of the day, and we assume all motions ajisihglfrom 
the floor will be ruled out of order. I I The agenda setter isl assumed 
I I ' to have complete knowledge of the preferences of all voters wll.ile I , 
the rest of the voters are assumed not to have enough iJforlnatlion I I I I on  the preferences of other voters or the structure of the agenda 
to be able to make use of it in any strategically advanJagebu 
manner. : I 
The above scenario might be a reasonable repiesentation 
I I 
of the state of information and control available in a fairly 
organization, which meets relatively infrequently ,  undej tile 
larg_ 
II con st 
I 
and in which the chairman (or agenda setter) is able to po�l the 
I 
membership prior to meeting time . S<eokbolder• �e<i� , 1raoe 
* I I Support for this research was provided by the National ScienGrant #SOC77-08291 . I acknowledge the assistance of GeorgJ D
for some discussions on probabilistic versions of the mbdel, 
Lydick for help on the computer work. I [ I 
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associations, interest groups and clubs would be examples of such 
organizations. The subject of this paper is how to design an optimal 
agenda in such circumstances, where by optimal agenda we mean an 
agenda which maximizes the expected utility to the agenda setter. 
It has long been known that in voting situations where a 
group must select an alternative out of a large (more than two element) 
alternative space, that the agenda, or order of consideration of 
alternatives , can itself be a factor in determination of the final 
outcome. See e.g. , Black [1978], Carrol [1873], and Farquharson [1969]. 
Recent papers by Plott and Levine [1977], and [1978] , demonstrate 
convincingly the existence of such an effect in an experimental setting. 
Although the importance of the agenda has been generally 
recognized, the extent to which the agenda can affect the final 
outcome in a given situation has not been satisfactorily answered. 
This is because there only exist, at present, models for determining 
the outcome of a given agenda (see Plott and Levine [1978]) and there 
are no systematic methods for determination of the "best" agenda for 
achieving a given outcome. In principle, once one has a model which 
determines the outcome of a given agenda, one could determine the 
best agenda by an exhaustive search, as long as the alternative 
space is finite. Unfortunately, the number of possible agendas is 
generally extremely large, even for relatively small problems , making 
this approach prohibitive. 
This paper formalizes the agenda design problem as a dynamic 
programming problem. Using this approach, it is possible to solve 
for optimal agendas in problems involving a moderate number of basic 
3 
alternatives. In any actual application, the structure of I th 
alternative space or the particular parliamentary rules in f fa ce 
would imply that only certain types of motions are admiisiil 
we have only introduced those restrictions which would be me
cases. But imposition of such additional restrictions bn lh
Het 
in !1�t 
feJ:m:lle 
I i 
agendas should. make the procedures of this paper computat}o
feasible on larger problems. II
ally 
Any model of the effect of the agenda must make l a 
about how individuals vote at various stages of the agehda J 
II sumpm:JJtlns 
. . d 1 I II existing mo e s two approaches have been taken, which vary ac 
to whether they assume voters are "sophisticated" or "niivd.11
Th t · f h · · d · . I 111 · e assump ion o sop isticate voters, origi�a .Y 
n t 
ord 
eve 
by Farquharson [1969], is equivalent to assuming a sortloflsuber 
Voters are assumed Ito 
perfect information about everyone else's preferences ald Jbo 
structure of the agenda. They then adopt optimal stratbgi�s !from 
a game theoretic point of view in the resulting n persol g� 
rationality on the part of the voters. have 
t td 
Such a game can also be expressed as a multi stage gamel ald �f 
the agenda is binary (i.e. , every vote involves only twb plss�ble 
I I 
outcomes) , it can be solved to determine the (unique) aitetnaltive 
that will be selected. This type of analysis establishls bh�t 
with sophisticated voters, binary agendas must lead to l1tlrnlativ 
, I 
in the top cycle set. (See McKelvey and Niemi [1978]).
In most empirical applications voters usually! do [ nolt 
have the information necessary to behave as sophisticated �o
further even if they have this information, time pressules l a 
the complexities of making the necessary calculations pleclud, 
rs, 
the 
d 
4possibility of sophisticated behavior. Further, the experiments of 
Plott and Levine do not provide any empirical support for sophisticated 
behavior. 
The second approach the assumption of naive voting --
takes a much more limited view of the information available to the voter, 
and hence of the level of rationality of which he is capable. 
Specifically, at any stage of the agenda, it is assumed that the 
voter does not have enough information about the preferences of others 
or of the subsequent agenda to allow him to infer anything about the 
outcome that will eventually prevail. Thus, his beliefs -- if he 
has any about what will finally happen are independent of the 
preference configurations of others. Plott and Levine [1978] develop 
a model of individual behavior in agendas for the naive case. They 
derive probabilities that a vote in an agenda will go a certain way 
by assuming that voters can be considered as random variables drawn 
from three possible decision rules. Although their model is consistent 
with the experimental data they report, the model is somewhat ad hoc, 
and there is not really enough data to reject alternative models. 
The approach taken in this paper is similar to that of Plott 
and Levine in that it assumes naive voters. However, rather than 
modeling this as they do, we take a more standard decision theoretic 
approach, and assume that each voter is a subjective expected utility 
maximizer. Thus, at each stage of the agenda, we assume that if a voter 
is faced with a choice between different sets of alternatives, he has 
some probability distribution representing his subjective estimate that 
each of the alternatives in a set will eventually prevail if that set is 
chosen. The voter then chooses between the sets on the basis of 
expeo"d utili<y. Individ�1' =y differ in their �<i=t• 
probability of given events, and the approach allows fJr the 
any empirically estimated distribution of such beliefs ] I 
The remainder of the paper is organized as �ol�ow
I I 
I 5 
of tlli use 0 
Section 2 gives definitions and notation, introducing in du 
voters, agendas, and the agenda setter. Section 3 fo�al1ze the 
problem as a dynamic programming problem, and shows hol tJis fo�Ull.htion 
can be used to obtain simple algorithms for the computltiJn f tJl 
I 1 I I value of a given agenda and for the determination of the dpt·mal 
I 
Section 4 gives examples illustrating the use of these metlhotls on I 
specific problems, and Section 5 gives conclusions aloµg Jit 
suggestions for further modifications of the model. 
2. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION
2.1 An Example 
Before proceeding with the formal definitions, wl dive a I 
short example intended to motivate the particular fo�lif aclion 
used here. We consider a board of directors of a comp1any l f ced i 
For, si-lnp a decision as to whether to build any new plants. 
there are four alternatives. They are 
icitJ 
a = build no plants I I 
b = build plants in both St. Louis and P.ittsb�rgh I . 
c = build only one plant in Pittsburgh 
d = build only one plant in St. Louis. I 
nda. 
h 
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There are several ways in which the board might proceed 
to consider these alternatives. One way is to propose and vote 
sequentially on the following motions. 
(i) 
(ii) 
Shall we build a plant in Pittsburgh 
Shall we build a plant in St. Louis. 
This procedure can be represented by the voting tree illustrated in 
Figure l(a).  
Now by changing the order or form of the motions that are 
made, we can change the form of the agenda, and of the corresponding 
voting tree. Thus Figure lb represents the voting tree that results 
from reversing the order of consideration of the two cities. Figure 
2 represents the agenda resulting from the following sequence of motions. 
(i) Do we want to construct any new plants 
(ii) If so, do we want to construct one or two 
(iii) If we want only one, shall it be in Pittsburgh 
or St. Louis. 
A more complicated agenda that might arise from strict 
adherence to parliamentary procedures is in Figure 3. 
from the following sequence of motions. 
This arises 
(i) I move we build two new plants, one in Pittsburgh 
and one in St. Louis. 
(ii) I move that we amend the preceding motion to specify 
only one plant in Pittsburgh 
(iii) I move we amend Pittsburgh to St. Louis 
N 
a 
a 
d c 
(a) 
b 
y 
a 
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b 
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Here, if we follow Robert's Rules of Order, the amendment to the 
amendment (motion (iii)) is voted on first, then the amendment (motion (ii)), 
then the original (perhaps amended) motion. This yields the voting 
tree of Figure 3. 
Now, in each of the above agendas, individuals must vote 
in the early stages of the agenda in the absence of any knowledge 
of what the outcomes of later motions are. All the voter knows for 
sure is that if the vote results in the choice of one branch, then the
final outcome must be one of the alternatives at the terminal nodes 
following that branch. So the voters must effectively choose between 
sets of alternatives. Correspondingly, an agenda can be viewed as 
a means of successively subdividing ·a set (of presently feasible 
alternatives) into smaller subsets of alternatives. Thus, in the 
agenda of Figure l(a), before the first motion is voted on, all 
four alternatives, i.e. , {a, b, c, d} are feasible. The first motion 
proposes to limit the feasible set to either {a, d} or {c, b }, depending 
on the outcome of the first vote. If the outcome is {a, d}, the 
next motion, which is also the final motion, proposes to choose 
either {c} or {d}. 
In order to predict what will happen in agendas of the 
above sort, we first need a model of individual behavior in the 
early stages of the agenda. This is the subject of Section 2. 2. 
In order to then find optimal agendas, we need to specify, fairly 
rigorously, the class of admissible motions and agendas. Section 
2.3 does this. Finally, to know what is optimal, we have to know 
the preferences and information available to the agenda setter. 
Section 2.4 treats this. 
2.2 Alternatives, Voters and Preferences 
Let X = {x1, . . . , xm} be a finite set of
We let X = (J' (X) denote the set of all nonempty
� = (p(�) be the set of all nonempty subsets of _!.
are then sets of alternatives, and will be 
of � are sets of sets of alternatives, and
etc . For any finite set A, we let IAI 
of A. 
We assume that N = {1, 2, • • .  , n} is a set 
that for each voter i E N, there is a function ui
voter i's utility function over X. We further
voter, there is a probability distribution associated 
possible sets that could be arrived at, reflecting that 
estimate of the likelihood of the eventual 
in that set, conditional on that set being on the floor. 
formally, for each i E N and S E _!, there is a function
satisfying 
l PS i (x)xES ' 
1 
and 
PS .(x) > 0,1 
for all x E S. For each i E N, then, it follows that we 
the utility function of voter i to X as follows: For any
S E _!,
9 
µwe 
10 
..£. (S) = l u.(x)ps i(x)1 xES 1 ' 
(2. 2 . 2) 
Now for each i E N, .!:!_ i defines a binary relation !i on
X as follows: For any S,T E X
S!i T � .!:!_i (S) .'.'._ .!:!_i (T) (2 . 2 .3) 
In the usual manner, we can let !'..i and Ii represent the strict
and indifferent portions of !i· Thus, S!'._iT <:;==> (S!iT and - (T!iS)),
and Sl_iT <=9 (S!iT and T!iS) . Now, we let .§1.i be the set of all
possible binary relations on _! generated in the above fashion, and
n
let .§1. =.rr .§l_i . Elements of .Q. are denoted != (!1, . . .  ,.!;,.)·i=l 
It should be emphasized that the above assumptions are 
equivalent to assuming naive voters . Thus the Ps . are independent ,i 
of the agenda, (to be defined in the next section) and of the preferences 
of other voters . This is a reasonable assumption when voters do not 
have prior information on the structure of the agenda or on the preferences 
of other voters . If they do have such information, and time to make 
use of it, this model would not be appropriate . Rather, we would 
want a model which allowed for sophisticated behavior on the part of 
voters, as in McKelvey and Niemi [1978] . 
2 .  3 The Agenda 
We assume there is a social choice function, operating 
over all subsets of _!, by which decisions at each step of the agenda
(to be defined below) are to be made . Specifically, we let 
C : .Q. x ! + ! be a decisive social choice function . I . e . ,  for any
II 
10 
S E X, and R E  8, C(R,S) E S .  Next, for each S E _!, wel a•lu e 'h< 
- = - -- - I I 
is a set D c EP (fl' (S) ) , called the decision set associated ith S s - I I I 
element of DS is denoted ds, and is called a motion . le 6ut ome , 
the motion d S is the set C (R, ds) E ds . The space � = TI D� · skx 
1- 1 the agenda space, and an element of � is called an agenda, lwr! 
with oS representing the element of o pertaining to S . I I 
Interpreting the above definitions, we can th�nk 6f
the set S c X as the set of alternatives that are still lndlr 
consideration at a particular point in time . A motion, kS'. l is a
particular subdivision of S into one or more (perhaps ovlrl�p 
subsets of S .  Voters then choose among these subsets uslng t 
social choice rule, leading to a new set C(!,ds) E dS w
h�ch [ tnien 
comes under consideration .  
{ I  For example, if S = a, b, c}, then a motion jo1[-d lbe 
of the form, say, d = { {b , c} , {a , c}} . This particular :nl.otll.on s I ! 
equivalent to a motion to "eliminate a in favor of b • " I1 the 
voters choose the set {b, c}, then this set is considerea n�xtl. 
The decision set, DS' represents the set of allowable, ol 11le 
motions given that the set S is on the floor. In a givet a�pl�cat�ql!ill 
the parliamentary rules would determine what the set DS loo
Rs 
So for example we might have DS = {{{b,c} , {a}},{{a,b},{l}} J {{ 
if the rules only allowed for motions which partition thl slt 
We consider several possible restrictions on DS below . I I 
An agenda, o, is then a specification of a motiori, rs• 
determines an outcome in oS,) for every possible subset l .=.Ix. Gi 
agenda, <hen, "ar'""' a< =y oe< S _'O X, one =uld <h� �vi f<om ' 
An 
} }} 
"ch 
an 
to set, 
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in the manner described above until one eventually arrived at a unique 
alternative in X (i.e., a singleton set). The concept of an agenda 
used here is similar to the game theoretic notion of a strategy. 
The agenda specifies a plan (i.e., a motion) for every contingency 
that might arise, even though, as we shall see, in any use of the agenda, 
only a small number of these contingencies will actually arise. 
Finally, the set /:;. simply represents the set of all possible agendas
under the rules. 
Throughout this paper, we impose a general restriction 
on /:;.. It is· assumed that for all S E !, Ds satisfies the following
condition: for all S E !, and Si E .£_ E DS,
Si s «> Isl 1 (2,3.1) 
This condition requires nontrivial subdivisions to be made whenever 
S is not a singleton set. 
In addition to the above general restriction on /:;., there
are a number of restrictions that would be implied by particular 
parliamentary rules. We will not attempt to model in a detailed 
fashion such restrictions, but introduce several conditions that are 
common to many such systems: 
(a) (binary procedures) For all S E! with Isl > 1, and
for all.£. E DS' IE.I = 2 .
All common parliamentary procedures satisfy condition (a), 
because all business must come to the floor in the form of motions, 
which are each disposed of one at a time, in order of precedence, by a 
binary decision on whether to accept or reject the motion. See. 
e.g., Robert's Rules of Order [1970]. 
illustrate this. 
(b) (partitioning procedures) For all S E 
.£. partitions S. 
In a parliamentary setting, partitioning 
naturally out of motions to divide the question or 
consider by paragraph or 
Order, pp. 230-237). Also, sequential consideration 
separate issues results in partitioning type procedures 
trees in Figures 1 and 2 of section 2.1 are of 
(c) (sequential or elimination procedures) 
with Isl > 1, and for all Si E S E DS'
Although it may not be immediately 
procedures this procedure corresponds 
between two alternatives, then voting between the 
vote and the third alternative, placing the winner 
the fourth alternative, etc. Amendment procedures, 
illustrated in Figure 3 are of this form, 
(d) (successive procedure) (a) and (b) 
further for all S E !, and.£. E DS, I 
some S. E S. ]_ 
This procedure corresponds to procedures 
for nominations or "filling blanks," 
candidates, and one is selected by taking the 
x 
nst 
majority. The voting tree of Figure 2 is of this form. 
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Although the above restrictions on allowable motions limit 
considerably the number of agendas in �. it should be noted that the
agenda space is still generally too large to be able to use simple 
·enumeration for finding "best" agendas. For example, with !xi = m,
m (k)(�) the total number of binary sequential agendas is II 2 
l.<,=2 
Thus, if m = 4, there are 468 such agendas, and for m = 5, there
are about 4.59 x 109 such agendas. Similarly, the total number of 
m 
binary partitioning agendas is II . 
k=2 
(2k-1 _ 1)(�). So for m 4 ,  there
10 are 567 such agendas, and for m = 5, there are about 1.49 x 10 such 
agendas . 
There are further restrictions on the allowable motions that 
are usually implied by parliamentary rules. In particular , germaneness 
considerations frequently would greatly reduce the number of 
allowable motions. These type of restrictions are dependent , 
however, on the structure of the alternative space, and are not 
dealt with here. 
2.4 The Agenda Setter 
In addition to the voters , N ,  we assume there is an additional 
actor , the agenda setter , who also has preferences over the alternative 
space. His preferences are represented by the function u0 : X + R 
(u0 may coincide with ui for some i £ N).
The problem considered in the next section is '1tha� df . 
1 
designing an agenda which is best from the agenda setter's io�nt OD 
view. The answer to this question depends on the amount of l idform� 
which we assume is available to the agenda setter. ThroJghtu�, 
we always assume that the agenda setter has complete kno
J
ledge of 
the utility functions , u. , for all voters i £ N. However , Lelassum· 
the agenda setter may or
1
may not have complete knowledgj ofl ttle 
individual •ubjee,ive prubabili'Y f�e,iun• Ps , i" In ,Jr•r 1 '' ubro 
any results, we must assume that the agenda setter himself ha 
some subjective estimate of the likelihood of any given ls l. I Now
I ,i each possible Ps . can be viewed as a point in the correspo�d:ijng ,i I I IS I dimensional simplex. We let cr l SI represent this simpl:t.ex� !Then, 
for each i £ N ,  o £ �. and S £ X, we assume there is a flncbian 
fS , i  : cr
l s l + R. If the distri�ution is continuous , fs , I . if 
the probability density function associated with the ageLda l 
setter's subjective distribution of the Ps .. If the d�str�bution 
is discrete , we assume fs . represents the
,
:robability jassl 
,i I , function. In the case of full information , fS . is discretk , ,i I I 
and reduces to the following. 
fs . (q) ={ 1 if q. = Ps . (x . ) for all jJ ,i J ,i 
0 otherwise 
In the case of partial information , fS ,i  
to be a continuous distribution over the 
would generallYt 
simplex , a l SI .
I 
assumed 
on 
2.4.1) 
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Now it should be noted that, although the notation is 
suppressed , each individual preference relation B:_i is a function
of Ps ,i
S E X. 
Hence C(B:_ , �) is also a function of Ps , i  for all i E N and
Thus, if the Pg i are random variables, then so is C(B:_ , �).' 
We use the notation Pr[C(B:_ , �) = T] to denote the probability, under 
the joint distribution on the Pg i' that C(B:_ ,� = T.' 
In this paper, we deal only with two cases: one assumes 
complete information on the part of the agenda setter , with all 
voters using an average value rule , the second assumes partial 
information on the part of the agenda setter , with the agenda setter 
assuming all subjective probability estimates by the voters are 
equally likely. We do not claim that either of these cases is a 
good model of actual behavior , but use them only to illustrate the 
methods described in this paper. In any actual application, different 
assumptions on the f8 . can be substituted without affecting,i 
any of the results described in the following sections. In fact, 
in empirical applications it is, of course, very unlikely one 
would have much information on the Pg . •  In this case one,i 
could use distributions, f8 . estimated exogenously from experimental,i 
data. We now describe formally the two cases considered here: 
Case I-a (Full Information , Average Utility). For all 
i E N, and SE 2f., f8 i is as in (2.ii.l), with' 
PS . (x.) = ,i J 
�__!_ i£ x. € s 
Is l J 
0 otherwise 
(2.L�.2) 
This corresponds to the case where all voters assume 
in S is equally likely, and hence choose between 
basis of which has the highest average utility. 
case of partial information , we consider the following 
Case II-a (Partial Information, Uniform 
i E N , s E X, and p ,q  E 0 1 8 '
fs .(p),i fs .(q),i 
Case II-a corresponds to the case when the agenda 
any subjective distribution over the alternatives in 
likely. A more reasonable assumption than either of 
cases might be to assume that f8 . could be a general,i 
distribution on o l s l . Both models above then become
For the purposes of tractability, we confine 
illustrations to the above two models. 
3. AGENDA DESIGN AS A DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING PROBLEM 
3.1 The Value of a Given Agenda 
The first question we address is that of 
the "value" of a given agenda. Thus, given an agenda o 
we wish to find a function v0 : 2f. + R, such that for all 
v0 (S) represents (in a sense to be made precise 
below) tche 
17 
at iv 
he 
al 
s tH 
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eme 
as es 
utility to the agenda setter of being at S under the agelda 
To answer this question, we let V be the space of all rJa1
functions on X. Then, for each SE ! ,  d8 E D8, and v J V , ldefine 
.ii .3) 
the "return function, "  h, as follows: 
h(S ,ds , v)
{ l Pr[C(B:_, ds)S.EdS
:0(x) where x E S
S .]v(S .) if Isl. l. 
if Isl 
> 1
1 
In the case of full information on the part of the agenda setter , 
(3.1.1) reduces to { v(C (B:_,ds))
h(S, ds, v) = 
u0(x) where x E S
if Isl > 1
if Isl = 1 
The function h(S , dS, v) represents the value the agenda
setter should assign to the set S if this value is to represent 
18 
(3.1 . 1) 
(3.1.2) 
the expected value of S, and is also to be consistent with the values 
v(Si) assigned to the sets Si E dS. Now in general, given a
particular o E fi and v E V , v(S) need not be equal to h(S , o s ,v) for
all S E _!, because the values assigned by v to different sets may
not be consistent with each other under the agenda o. An appropriate 
value for the agenda o is a function v0 which is always consistent
in the above sense. Thus , such a function should satisfy 
Vo (S) h(S,os , vo )
for each S E X. 
Now it is easily verified that h satisfies the n stage 
contraction and monotonicity assumptions for dynamic programming 
(3.1.3) 
problems (see Appendix). Hence for each agenda o E �. 
a unique element v0 E V satisfying (3.1.3). (See
Now as discussed in Denardo,  v0 can be computed
as follows: Define , for each o E �. the function Ho : V
[H0 (v)] (S) h(S ,o  s,v)
For any v0 E V ,  define vi = H0 (vi-l) for all i > O.
vi + v0 , where the convergence is exact after some
steps. In this application , if we set v0(s) = 0
above algorithm corresponds to starting with the last 
agenda and working backwards, computing the value of 
terms of the (already computed) values of the succeeding 
3.2 The Optimal Agenda 
Of more interest is the optimal agenda. 
to find (if it exists) an agenda ,  o 
* E fi, and the corresp6ndi!ngl 
function v* E V such that for all S E _!,
v* (S) v0 * (S) = sup v0 (S)o Efi 
Again, since the n stage contraction assumption is 
follows that v*
agenda o * which can be found by a simple iterative oroceaur 
Specifically, following Denardo, define the function A 
19 
1.4) 
of 
the 
he 
in 
want 
"·2 .1) 
(Av)(S) sup h(S,d8,v)d8e:D8
20 
The mapping A has a unique fixed point, v*, which corresponds to the
solution to (3.2.1). This can be obtained iteratively by letting 
v0 E V be any initial function, and then setting vi = Avi-l for
i > 1. It follows that vi+ v
*. Again, in this application,
convergence is exact after a finite number of steps, and we take 
o* to be any agenda which attains v*. I.e., such that H0 *(v
*) = v*.
4. EXAMPLES
(3.2.2) 
We consider two examples. The first example has three voters 
and five alternatives. The second has nineteen voters, and eight 
alternatives, and corresponds to an example run experimentally by 
Plott and Levine [1974]. Preferences of the voters in these two 
examples are given in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. As in Plott 
and Levine, we consider here only binary agendas, and assume that the 
choice function, at each stage, corresponds to majority rule. 
Specifically, if S = {sk,S.},- J 
C(B-_,.§.) sk <=i> j {i e: N I s P s.} k-i J > lh E N  I S.f..Sk} i J ]_ 
The first example has a completely cyclic social ordering, 
as illustrated in Table 1 ,  while the second example is transitive, 
with the exception of an intransitive indifference between c, e 
and h .  Thus, we expect that a sequential agenda can attain any 
outcome in Example 1, but only alternative f in Example 2. A
(4 . 1) 
partitioning or other nonsequential procedure 
Example 2 to get alternatives other than f. 
In the computation of the optimal agendas 
the agenda setters preferences are assumed to be as 
last rows of Tables 1 and 2. In both examples, the 
preferences are picked to represent the inverse 
order, so that we can investigate how far down in the 
possible to get with the optimal agenda. (In example 
order is cyclic, the "natural" social order is assumed 
by the sum of the utilities.) We first consider the 
model for both these examples and then the partial 
Case I: Full Information, Average Utility 
Tables 3 and 4 give the. optimal sequential
partitioning agenda, respectively, for example 1. 
describe the complete agenda, indicating the value, 
alternative, as well as the optimal pair of sets �i
into which S . should be divided. The columns ]_ 
indicate the outcome of this division. Pr(Sj) = 1
division will result in S., while Pr(S . ) = 0 J J 
division will result in Sk (so Pr(Sk) = 1).
bottom of each table display the "reachable" 
The 
i.e . ,  those sets which can conceivably be reached by
of the entire set S = X.
s, 
al 
is 
cial 
en 
DS,. 
Voter 
if 
1 
2 
3 
0 
TABLE 1 
Utility of Voters over X 
a -
12 
9 
7 
2 
Alternative 
b c d -
2 5 9 
13 0 1 
10 15 0 
5 10 20 
Majority Relation over X 
e 
1 
2 
1 
26 
(Double arrow indicates Pareto preference.) 
:ti1 
c d� 
Example 1. Preferences of Voters and 
Social Ordering 
22- 3 
TABLE 2 
Utility of Voters over X+ 
Alternative I 
Voter FF:A I 
i 
r: FFF FFC FFA FFFF FFFC �FCL II a b c d e [g 
1 0.50 6.00 1.00 0.25 0.75 8.00 
I I 0 00 5 .  
I 
2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 5.00 4.50 8.( 0 25 I 
3 0.55 8.00 0.49 0.40 7.80 0.45 v ·' 0 29 I 
4 3.80 7.50 3.50 0.90 4.00 3.80 8.1 0 00 
5 3.00 2.00 5.00 4.00 7.00 8.00 �.I 0 00 I 
6 6.00 8.00 4.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 v .( 0 00 ' 
7 4.00 6.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 
I �·' 0 00 
8 1.00 1.00 8.00 1.00 1.00 8·.00 �.I 0 00 F·'no I 9 2.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 4.00 8.00 00
10 2.00 3.00 4.00 2.00 5.00 6.00 F .1bo 00 
11 1.00 7.50 7.40 2.00 2.00 8.00 iJ .1DO 00 l  
12 2.00 8.00 2.00 7.00 6.00 5.00 !l .rbO 00 
13 7.00 6.00 5.00 7.00 1.00 8.00 :2.lhO 00 
I 
14 3.00 2.00 2.00 7.00 1.00 8.00 � .IDO 00 
15 1.00 7.00 7.00 2.00 2.00 8.00 �· 0 60 
16 7.00 7.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 2. DO 00 
1.00 2.00 8.00 7.00 3.00 7.00 I 17 .6.1lO 00 
18 7.00 7.00 6.00 8.00 5.00 5.00 �-DO 00 
!6. 0 
I 
19 7.00 7.00 6.00 1.00 1.00 8.00 I 00 
0 8.00 2.00 5.00 7.00 6.00 1.00 I �· bo II 00
Majority Relation over X 
f .. b .. g 
·@ · d .. a 
Example 2. Preferences of Voters and 
Social Ordering 
+This example is from Pldtt and Levine (1974). 
I . .  
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Note that the optimal sequential agenda corresponds, as we 
would expect, to the unique cycle ending at e which passes through 
all points in X. Thus the first division corresponds to a vote 
between a and b. When b wins, the second division is between b 
and c, etc. As expected, a partitioning agenda in this case 
can not do as well as the sequential agenda. The partitioning 
agenda only can obtain d, while the sequential agenda can attain e. 
Table 5 gives the reachable portion of the optimal partitioning 
agenda for example 2 .  The agenda obtains c with probability 
1 and2 
h with probability t . These are the fourth and fifth ranked alternatives 
for the agenda setter, and represent the lowest alternatives in the 
social order which can be obtained by any agenda under model I-a 
(see Table 8).
Case II: Partial Information, Uniform Prior 
For the case of partial information, we assume the uniform 
prior model, Case II-a, as defined in Section. 2. In order to solve 
for this model, we need to determine Pr[C(R,d8) = S. ] for all S E X,- J -
and Sj E d8 E n8. Since the closed form expression for this probability 
would be quite complex, and would be dependent on the particular form 
of the distribution fS . of the Pg . which is assumed, we elected to ,1 ,1 
compute these values using Monte Carlo methods. This was done as 
follows: For each S E _!, and d8 E n8, a trial consisted of a 
drawing of Pg . for each i EN and S. E d8• For each trial, we can j'i J 
then compute u.(S. ) for each i EN and S. E d8. From this information, � J J 
we can compute C (�,d8) for this particular trial. 
k Let c (_g_,d8)
25 
TABLE 3 
OPTIMAL SEQUENTIAL AGENDA FOR EXAMPLE 1 UNDER MODEL I-1 
(FULL INFORMATION AVERAGE UTILITY MODEL) 
Next Alternatives 
Set # Value Division Probability in Set 
i v(S1) sj 
sk Pr(Sj
) Pr(Sk) a b c d e 
1 26.000 0 0 0 0 1 
2 20.000 0 0 0 1 0 
3 26.000 2 1 0.00 1.00 0 0 0 1 1 
4 10.000 0 0 1 0 0 
5 10.000 4 1 1.00 0.00 0 0 1 0 1 
6 20.000 4 2 0.00 1.00 0 0 1 1 0 
7 26.000 5 3 0.00 1.00 0 0 1 1 1 
8 5.000 0 1 0 0 0 
9 5.000 8 1 1.00 o.oo 0 1 0 0 1 
10 5.000 8 2 1.00 o.oo 0 1 0 1 0 
11 5.000 10 3 1.00 0.00 0 1 0 1 1 
12 10.000 8 4 o.oo 1.00 0 1 1 0 0 
13 10.000 12 5 1.00 0.00 0 1 1 0 1 
14 20.000 10 6 0.00 1.00 0 1 1 1 0 
15 26.000 11 7 0.00 1.00 0 1 1 1 1 
16 2.000 1 0 0 0 0 
17 2.000 16 1 1.00 o.oo 1 0 0 0 1 
18 2.000 16 2 1.00 0.00 1 0 0 1 0 
19 2.000 18 3 1.00 0.00 1 0 0 1 1 
20 2.000 16 4 1.00 0.00 1 0 1 0 0 
21 2.000 20 5 1.00 0.00 1 0 1 0 1 
22 2.000 20 6 1.00 0.00 1 0 1 1 0 
23 2.000 22 7 1.00 o.oo 1 0 1 1 1 
24 5.000 16 8 0.00 1.00 1 1 0 0 0 
25 5.000 24 9 1.00 0.00 1 1 0 0 1 
26 5.000 24 10 1.00 0.00 1 1 0 1 0 
27 5.000 26 19 1.00 0.00 1 1 0 1 1 
28 10.000 20 12 0.00 1.00 1 1 1 0 0 
29 10.000 28 21 1.00 o.oo 1 1 1 0 1 
30 20.000 22 14 0.00 1.00 1 1 1 1 0 
31 26.000 23 15 o.oo 1.00 1 1 1 1 1 
(26) abi:de 
I \ acde bcde 
(2) 
b/ \ cde 
(5) 
/\ ce de 
(10) 
di \ e 
(20) (26) 
Set # 
i 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
TABLE 4 
OPTIMAL PARTITIONING AGENDA FOR EXAMPLE 1 
(FULL INFORMATION AVERAGE UTILITY MODEL) 
Next Altematives 
Value Division 
v(Si) sj 
sk 
26.000 
20.000 
26.000 2 1 
10.000 
10.000 4 1 
20.000 4 2 
20.000 6 1 
5.000 
5.000 8 1 
5.000 8 2 
5.000 10 1 
10.000 8 4 
10.000 12 1 
10.000 12 2 
20.000 9 6 
2.000 
2.000 16 1 
2.000 16 2 
2.000 18 1 
2.000 16 4 
2.000 20 1 
2.000 20 2 
20.000 17 6 
5.000 16 8 
5.000 24 1 
5.000 24 2 
5.000 26 1 
5.000 24 4 
10.000 17 12 
10.000 18 12 
20.000 25 6 
Probability 
Pr(S
j
) Pr(Sk) 
0.00 
1.00 
0.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.00 
1.00 
1.00 
o.oo 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
(20) 
abcde 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.00 
o.oo 
o.oo 
1.00 
0.00 
1.00 
o.oo 
0.00 
0.00 
o.oo
1.00 
o.oo 
0.00 
1.00 
o.oo
o.oo
0.00 
o.oo
0.00 
o.oo 
1.00 
1.00 
o.oo
o.oo
o.oo 
o.oo 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
/� 
�e � 
/\ /� 
ab e 
/ \ 
(26) 
a b 
(2) (5) 
c 
(4) 
d 
(20) 
in Set 
a b c d e 
0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 1 0 1 
0 0 1 1 0 
0 0 1 1 1 
0 1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 1 
0 1 0 1 0 
0 1 0 1 1 
0 1 1 0 0 
0 1 1 0 1 
0 1 1 1 0 
0 1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 1 1 
1 0 1 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 
1 0 1 1 0 
1 0 1 1 1 
1 1 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 1 
1 1 0 1 0 
1 1 0 1 1 
1 1 1 0 0 
1 1 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 
26 
/
a 
(8) 
Set II 
i 
255 
247 
231 
198 
196 
132 
128 
64 
33 
32 
16 
8 
4 
2 
1 
/
af 
I 
TABLE 5 
REACHABLE PORTION OF OPTIMAL PARTITIONING AGENDA 
FOR EXAMPLE 2 UNDER MODEL I-a 
(FULL INFORMATION AVERAGE UTILITY MODEL) 
Next 
Value Division Probability 
v(Si) sj 
sk Pr(Sj
) Pr(Sk) 
4.500 247 8 1.00 0.00 
4.500 231 16 1.00 o.oo 
4.SOO 198 33 0.00 1.00 
3.000 196 2 o.oo 1.00 
2.000 132 64 0.00 1.00 
1.000 128 4 o.oo 1.00 
8.000 126 1 0.00 1.00 
2.000 64 0 1.00 0.00 
4.SOO 32 1 .so .so 
5.000 32 0 1.00 o.oo 
7.000 16 0 1.00 o.oo 
6.000 8 0 1.00 0.00 
1.000 4 0 1.00 0.00 
3.000 2 0 1.00 0.00 
4.000 1 0 1.00 0.00 
(4.0) 
abcdefg 
/ ""' 
abcdfgh e 
/ \ 
(6) 
abcfgh d 
/ \ (7) 
abfg ch 
/ \ •/\ 
abf g c h 
\ (3) (5) (4) 
b 
I 
I I Alt��n;��r I a bcd e f g h
11 1 1 1 111 1 1 
11 1 1 0 1 1 1  
111 0 0 1 1 1  
11 0 0 0 1 1 0 
1 1 0 0 0 11 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0,0 00 1 0 0 0 o, 0 o, 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
0 01 0 0 0:0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0,0 00 0 0 0 1 0
1
0 0
0 0 0 0 0 ] 0 0, 
0 0 0 0 0 « 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
\f 
(2) 
(1) 
' 
27 
Set II 
i 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
TABLE 6 
OPTIMAL PARTITIONING AGENDA FOR EXAMPLE 1 
UNDER MODEL II-a 
(PARIIAL INFORMATION, UNIFORM PRIOR) 
Next Alternatives 
Value 
v(Si) 
26.000 
20.000 
26.000 
10.000 
10.000 
20.000 
20.510 
5.000 
5.000 
5.000 
5.525 
10.000 
10.000 
10. 750 
14. 750 
2.000 
2.000 
2.000 
2.360 
2.000 
4.920 
2.720 
9.830 
5.000 
5.000 
5.000 
5.000 
6.400 
7 .900 
7.625 
12.575 
Division Probability 
sj sk 
Pr(Sj) Pr(Sk) 
2 
4 
4 
6 
8 
8 
10 
8 
12 
12 
9 
16 
16 
18 
16 
17 
20 
17 
16 
24 
24 
26 
24 
25 
24 
25 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
4 
1 
2 
6 
1 
2 
1 
4 
4 
2 
6 
8 
1 
2 
1 
4 
4 
6 
6 
(12.575) 
abcde 
o.oo 
1.00 
0.00 
0.91 
1.00 
1.00 
0.97 
o.oo 
1.00 
0.92 
0.35 
1.00 
1.00 
0.98 
1.00 
0.63 
0.96 
0.56 
0.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
o. 72 
0.42 
0.82 
0.49 
·47 �l 
abe cd 
1.00 
0.00 
1.00 
0.08 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
1.00 
0.00 
0.07 
0.65 
0.00 
o.oo 
0.01 
o.oo 
0.36 
0.04 
0.43 
1.00 
0.00 
o.oo 
o.oo 
0.28 
0.58 
0.17 
0.51 
i.r � -0 o.cy' "{·o 
ab 
/\ 
a b 
(2) (5) 
e 
(26) 
c d 
(10) (20) 
in Set 
a b c d 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 1 1 
0 0 1 1 
0 1 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 1 0 1 
0 1 0 1 
0 1 1 0 
0 1 1 0 
0 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 
1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
l 1 0 0 
1 1 0 0 
1 1 0 1 
1 1 0 1 
1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
28 
e 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
TABLE 7 
REACHABLE PORTION OF OPTIMAL PARTITIONING AGENDA 
FOR EXAMPLE 2 UNDER MODEL II-a 
(PARTIAL INFORMATION - UNIFORM PRIOR MODEL) 
Next AlternatiJes 
Set II Value Division Probability in Set i v(S1) sj sk Pr(Sj) Pr(Sk) abcd e f g hi 
255 
222 
214 
212 
148 
144 
128 
64 
33 
32 
16 
8 
4 
2 
1 
4.052 222 33 .30 .70 
3.030 214 8 .99 .01 
3.000 212 2 0.00 1.00 
1.895 148 64 .11 .90 
1.000 144 4 o.oo 1.00 
7.000 128 16 0.00 1.00 
8.000 128 0 1.00 o.oo 
2.000 64 0 1.00 o.oo 
4.500 32 1 .50 .so 
5.000 32 0 1.00 0.00 
7 .000 16 0 1.00 o.oo 
6.000 8 0 1.00 0.00 
1.000 4 0 1.00 o.oo 
3.000 2 0 1.00 0.00 
4.000 1 0 1.00 o.oo 
(4 .052) 
abcdefgh 
/30 .7� 
abdefg ch 
.9y \.01 
/\ abdfg 
·7 �-0 
abdf g ·r \11 (3) 
b adf 
(2) i.oj �
f ad 
(1) i.r � 
a d 
(8) (7) 
e 
(6) c h 
(5) (4) 
11 1 1 1 1  1 ii 
11 0 1 1 1  i o l 
11 0 1 0 1  1 01 
11 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 010 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 010 0 
01 0 0 0 0 0 0
o o i o o oi o 1 1 
0 0 1 0 0 010 0
0 0 0 1 0 0,0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1! 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
o o o o o o[ o ii
I I 
9, 
represent the value of C(�,d8) on the k
th trial. If we draw K
trials, as above, an estimate of Pr[C(R,d8) = S. ] can then be - J 
obtained by taking 
Pr[C(�,d8) sj] 
I {k I ck(�,d8) cj}I 
K 
30 
(4.2) 
Using these estimated values as the true values, this allows 
computation of the return function as in (3.1.1) . The rest of the 
analysis proceeds as before. The accuracy of the optimal agenda 
using this approach will clearly depend on the accuracy of the 
estimates of the Pr[C(R,d8) = S. ]. We can get these estimates as - J 
close as desired to the true values by taking a large enough K. 
In the results reported here, we take K = 200. 
Tables 6 and 7 give the optimal partitioning agenda, for 
examples 1 and 2 respectively under Case II. Note that the 
reachable portion of the agenda for example 1 stays the same as 
it was under Case I, although the value of the agenda has decreased 
from 20 to 12.575, reflecting the probability that the first step 
of the agenda will fail. In Example 2, note that the optimal agenda 
still goes after c and h, but this is now the first order of business, 
where it has a relatively good probability of success. The likelihood 
of this step succeeding under the uniform prior model is 
only . 7. In the event this fails, the agenda then takes a long shot 
at e (with utility of 6), and in the event this fails, goes after 
g to get it with certainty. 
Finally, Table 8 gives the probability under an optimal 
Alternative 
Value - Case I-a 
Value - Case II-a 
TABLE 8 
Probability of Attaining each 
Alternative with Optimal Agenda 
for that Alternative 
I
F -+-- B- G- H�E+ D� II �-A I I  I I II 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .50 0.00 0·11 0.00 l o2J 1.00 1.00 1.0 .98 .34 .008 0.00 
I I 
I 
; 
32 
agenda of being able to obtain each of the alternatives in example 2.
(Thus, the entries in this table represent the value of an optimal 
agenda when the agenda setter assigns 1 to the given alternative, and 
0 to all other alternatives) . 
5. CONCLUSION 
The dynamic programming approach of this paper allows for 
constructing optimal agendas without the necessity of performing 
a complete search of the agenda space. Nevertheless, without further 
refinement or simplification, even with this approach, the technique 
is limited to be able to deal with small to moderate sized problems. 
The computer program which was used to calculate the optimal agendas 
in the previous section handles quite easily problems of the size 
of Example 1.
Also, in Case I-a, problems of the size of example 2, which 
involve nineteen voters and eight alternatives are handled easily 
(about 95 seconds of CPU time on an IBM 370). However, under Case 
II-a, this example requires about 25 minutes of CPU time. The large 
amount of time involved in solving Case II is due to the fact 
that Monte Carlo procedures are used to compute the Pr[C (S,R) = S. ]. - - J 
Thus, for each S E !, and ds E DS, two hundred draws are made from 
a random number generator for each i EN and S. E ds to determine �- J 
Pr[C(dS,R) = S.]. Obviously, closed form expressions for estimation - J 
of these probabilities would considerably reduce the computation time 
when large numbers of voters are involved. It is possible that the 
central limit theorem could be applied in such instances to obtain 
estimates of thes probabilities as long as fs . is indepbndent ,i  I of i. 
Even if olooed fo� oxpmaiona for 'he Pr [ C (S R) 11= t. ] 1- I J 
can be obtained, the computation time is still great enoJgh Ito 
imply that twelve to fifteen alternatives would be a limlt on the 
I I Two points sliou�d �e I I size of the problem that could be handled. 
3 
made in relation to this. First, the current version of Ith, computer program makes no attempt at efficiency. The meihodis dif 
Section 3 are applied directly, with no attempt to improve o� them. 
I ! Improvements could be made, for example by using branch and bomnd 
prooeduree '' do 'he aearoh implied by equa,ion (3.2.2). I T�a 
should allow for quickly discarding motions in DS which 9bvi�u$ly I I can do no better than an already discovered element, ds · 1 S�cmjtd, 
in any actual application, it is likely that there would be [addlitio 
restrictions on the set of allowable motions, DS' than those[' u$ed 
here. In particular, most partitioning schemes would noJ allo 
I . . . d.  1 1 1 I . I partitioning accor ing to nonsensica or over y comp ex ,ritierd!on. 
If there are a number of distinct issues, partitioning schem�s 
would generally be required to partition only according do these 
issues. Similar considerations would apply to the other �rohedures. 
I 
Such limitations on the DS have not been considered here,I 
befause 
they they are dependent on the structure of the issue spa,ce. [ 
I 
However there is no reason such limitations could not be lincbr ::'1 These limitations would drastically reduce the size of 
since compulation time seems to be linearly related to 
elements in the DS, this would enable the procedures to 
to larger alternative sets. 
th'.e 
t�e 
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I 
I 
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�I _,_,._ 
34 
APPENDIX 
I. Proof that [H(v)] (S) = h (S,os,v) satisfies the n stage contraction 
assumption: 
It must be shown that for some N > O, that for any v,w e: V, 3 c > 0
such that 
N N p[H0 v,H0wJ _s_ cp (v,w) 
where p (v,w) = sup I v (S) - w (S) I. In fact, we show a stronger 
Se:X 
result, namely that p[H� y, H� wJ = O, i.e. , 
N N H0v = H0w 
(B. l) 
(B.2) 
for any v,w e: V. In particular we will show that (B.2) is satisfied 
for N = m. To prove (B.2), we show that for any 1 _s_ k, if Sc X 
satisfies I s l  _s_ k, then for any v,w e: V
k [H0v] (S) 
k [H0w](S).
This is clearly true fork= 1, since when I s l  = 1, say S = {x}, 
then [H0v](S) = u0 (x) = [H0w](S). Now assume that (B. 3) is true 
(B. 3. ) 
for k, and we show it is true for k + 1. To see this, note first 
that if I s l  _s_ k + 1, then by (2.2.1), for any Si 
Thus, if 2 _s_ I s l  _s_ k + 1,
k+l k [Ho v] (S) = [Ho (Hov) l (S) 
k = h (S,o s,H0v) 
= I Pr[C (�,ds) sie:o s 
= I Pr [c (�,ds) sie:a s 
 
S. ]ll�v (J ) 1. u 1. 
k S. ]H..,w(S!) 1. u 1. 
k = h (S,os,H0w) [H�+lw] (S). 
u I s l  1, say S k+l {x}, then [H0 v](S) = u0 (x)
so 
[H�+lv] (S) [H�+lw] (S)
holds for all I s l  _s_ k + 1. But now, by induction, it 
that (B.3) is true for all k, in particular for k = m. 
I. e. , for all S � X, if I S I .S. m 
[H�v](S) [H�w](S).
But since jxl = m, I s l < m for all Sc X. Hence (B. 5) lis 
for all S � X, so 
35 
k. 
e 
II. 
36 I i I 3/l 
m m H0v = H0w (B. 7) 
Q.E.D. I REFERENCES 
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